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ABS TRACT
The simultaneous operation of per case and per service
payment systems in Maryland, and the varying levels of stringency
used in setting per case rates allows comparison of effects of
differing incentive structures on hospital costs. This paper
presents such a cothparison with 1977-1981 data. Cost per case
and total cost regressions show evidence of lower costs only
when per case payment limits are very stringent. Positive net
revenue incentives appear insufficient to induce reductions in
length of stay and in ancillary services use. Our resultssuggest
these changes in medical practice patterns are more likely
under the threat of financial losses.
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Background
As the limitations of cost reimbursement for hosnita].s became
widely recognized in the 1970's, a variety of Prosnective hospital
payment systems were initiated. Generally, these systems esta-
blished predetermined prices for specific types or classes of
billable services. While a recent national study1found that some
programs of this type had a significant imoact on unit costs, con-
cerns were expressed about incentives to increase volumes of
services and days of inoatient care under these ter service pay-
pient systems.2 Per case payment based on discharge diagnosis (and
other case-mix descriptions) was conceptualized as an alternative
approach that provided incentives for conservative use of ancillary
services and reductions in length of stay. Maryland was the first
state to introduce a oer case system in 1976 called the
Guaranteed Inpatient Revenue (GIR). New Jersey introduced a DRG-
based system in 1981 and Medicare's Prospective Payment System
(PPS) was enacted in 1983 with full implementation set for Fiscal
1988. Since the enactment of the PPS system, ni.mierous other states
and private insurers have moved toward implementation of their
own per case Payment systan.
The present paper is an empirical analysis ofexperience
under the Maryland per case payment system. TheMaryland Health
Services Cost Review Commission (IISCRC) begansettrig Dates for-2-
all hospitals in Maryland on a per service basis on July 1, 1974.
Beginning in late 1976, selected hospitals were placed by the HSCRC
on per case rates (the GIR) and during the five years of our study
period (July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1981) 22 of the 46 acute care
hospitals in our study had experience with per case payments. Medi-
care and Medicaid waivers that took effect on July 1, 1977 brought
all patients in the state under HSCRC rates, including the per case
rates for the CIR hospitals.
Procedures and Incentives Under Per Service Payment
Per service rates were set prospectively by the HSCRC each
year on the basis of budgeted volumes and costs in routine care,
special care, and ancillary patient service centers. After rates
were set in an initial round of detailed rate reviews (involving
examination of hospitals' financial data and comparisons with peer
institutions), they were trended forward annually to reflect in-
flation in factor costs and adjusted for volume variances. When
actual revenues in a year exceeded budgeted revenues because
service volumes were higher than projected, variable cost factors
of .6 for routine services and .4 for ancillary services were
applied to the excess revenue to determine how much of the excess
the hospital was permitted to retain. An incremental variable
cost factor of .7 was applied to revenues due to equivalent ad-
missions (i.e., admissions adjusted for outpatient activity) more
than 2 per cent above the projected level. This factor increased
to .8 for revenues due to actual equivalent admissions more than-3—
10 per cent above projected.
When actual revenues fell short of budgeted because ofvolume
variances, a variable cost factor of .2 was applied to determine
the unrecovered fixed costs to be included in thenext year's
rates. If a hospital also experienced a shortfall ofmore than
5 per cent from projected to actualequivalent admissions, the
incremental variable cost factor increased to .6 and .4 forrou-
tine care and ancillary cost services respectively.4 Theasymmetry
between the upward and downward variable cost factorswas intended
to encourage reductions in unnecessary utilization.5
By trending forward the initially-approved rates and rarely
using detailed rate reviews after the initial round, the "regu-
latory lag" of the HSCRC system was fairly long. This influenced
incentives in that net revenue gains from increased efficiency
(i.e., lower unit costs after adjustments for volume variances)
would continue to accrue to the hospital over a longperiod of
time (until rates were readjusted to actual costs in another de-
tailed rate review).
fUR Payments and Incentives
Per service rates were set for all hospitals (including the
fUR hospitals) and were the basis for generating bills to indivi-
dual patients or third-party payors. The GIRprogram superimposed
on this process a projected case-mix-adjusted revenue cap per case
for live discharges. If a GIR hospital realized an actualrevenue
per case below (above) its cap, it received additional (reduced)
revenues, via higher (lower) rates in the next year, equal to the-4-
relevant variable cost factor times the number of live discharges
times the difference between the cap and actual revenueper case.
For example, suppose a hospital's actual revenue exceeded its
projected revenue and its overall variable cost factor was approxi-
mately .5.If its case-mix-adjusted average revenue per case was
$500 below its GIR cap, and it had 5,000 live discharges, it re-
ceived $500 x 5,000 x .5 or $1,250,000 in additional allowable
revenue in next year's rates.
The purpose of the GIR program was to create incentives to
reduce length of stay and use of ancillary services. It is
possible, however, that it also encouraged increased admissions.
For instance, if a GIR hospital reduced its length of stay and
ancillary revenues per case by 5 per cent but simultaneously in-
creased its admissions by 5 per cent, so that its actual charges
were about equal to its projected charges, it would receive a
GIR "bonus" equal to 3.1 per cent of total revenues.6 Moreover,
if simultaneously decreasing length of stay and ancillary care
per case and increasing admissions in the same proportion has
little effect on costs, the 3.1 per cent GIR bonus is added to
net revenue. A per service hospital experiencing the same situa-
tion would receive no net revenue bonus at all.
In most cases, the GIR cap level was derived from the hospital's
ownchargesduring a base period of its choosing. For this
period, live discharges (excluding newborns) were grouped according
to a case-mix classification and average charge per case for each
group was computed. Adjustment of these average charges for rate-5-
chares between the base and current periods yieldedcurrent period
average charges which were then applied to the hospital's current
period frequency distribution of live discharges bygroup to deter-
mine its current period GIlt level.
In three instances, however, hospitals were judgedby the
HSCRC to have excessively high costs per case andwere placed on
an externally-determined percase revenue cap that was below their
historical experience. For these three hospitals, whichwe shall
term CAP hospitals, all of the excess ofaverage charge per case
above the cap was deducted from next year's rates whilesavings
below the cap were not added to next year's rates or to nextyear's
cap. Thus, the main effect of reducing length of stay or ancillary
use was to reduce losses. Bonus payments were not made for beating
the cap. Of course, reductions in case-mix costliness were also
encouraged since the cap for these hospitals was not case-mix-adjusted.
Finally, as in the case of the regular GIlt, additional admissions
could offset some of the negative impacts of reduced length-of-stay
or ancillary use on total revenues.
While the constraint on the CAP hospitals was mandatory, the
GIR program was phased in on a voluntary basis beginning in late 1976.
The HSCRC offered several inducements for hospitals togo on the
GIR, including an additional 1 per cent inflation allowance and
additional administrative expenses for a hospital to monitor its
own performance. In some cases, the GIR was offered to hospitals
as an alternative to a full review of rates which the HSCRC felt
would otherwise have been necessary because of major service
additions, expansions, or out-of-line cost perforniance.—6—
These inducements were strong enough to permit fairly rapid
implementation. Out of a total of 46 non-Federal general acute care
hospitals in the State in 1976, six went on the GIR in the latter
part of 1976 (including two CAP hospitals), six were added during
1977, six in 1978, three (including one CAP hospital) in 1979,
and one in 1980. Six of the hospitals, however, dropped off
the CIR program and returned to per service payment. These
were smaller hospitals, generally lacking adequate management
information systems. One of the two hospitals put on the CAP in
1976 switched to a regular CUR in 1981; the hospital put on the CAP
in 1979 switched to the regular GIR in late 1980.
Study Objectives arid Approach
The objective of the study reported upon in thispaper was
to assess the impacts of the CUR per case payment system by com-
paring the experience of Maryland's general acute care hospitals
under per case vs. per service payment. Our analysis pertains
to the fiscal years 1977-1981 and the 46 hospitals operating
throughout this period.7 Finpirical impact measures used in
aspects of the study reported elsewhere8 included numbers of
admissions, length of stay, hospital case-mix, charges for care
per case and per episode, and readmission rates. The current
paper reports estimates of GIR impacts on hospital total inpatient
costs and average cost per case.
Measures of inpatient cost, and of its two components -routine
and ancillary service costs, are used as our dependent variables.
Twodifferenttypes of regression models are employed. First,
efficiencyimpactsofthe CUR are estmiatccl ithin the context of—7—
a technological cost function relating cost to the volumeand mix
of output, input prices, and fixedinputs (capital-stock measures).
Second, we estimate behavioral cost regressions whosespecificatjo
is based on a standard short-run model ofhospital decision-making.9
The hospital decision-makers are presumed to choosevariable input
quantities and output prices so as to maximize an objectivefunction
subject to a downward-sloping product demand curve, technology,
input price, and fixed capital constraints. Assuming an interior
solution to this maximization process, the resulting optimal level
of cost can be related, via the first-order maximization conditions,
to the exogenous factors that determine the constraints faced by
the hosoital. The regression model presented here may be viewed
as an estimate of this relationship. Accordingly, the independent
variables included in this inodelpertain to market demand conditions,
input prices, and the hospital's fixed capital stock. Output volume
and mix variables are endogenous and therefore not included.
The different specifications of these two approaches give
rise to different interpretations of the estimated CIR effects.
In the cost function analysis, coefficients for the GIR variables
measure the effect of the GIR on efficiency, that is, on the
cost of producing any given volume and mix of output. In the
behavioral models, since output volume and mix variables are
excluded, estimated GIR coefficients reflect both efficiency
impacts and the cost implications of GIR impacts on the volume
and mix of output.-8—
Definition of Variables
The measure of cost used to define our dependent variables
is the reimbursable cost of inpatient services as reported in
the Medicare Cost Reports (MCRs) filed annually by the study
hospitals. This figure includes: routine cost of adult, pediatric,
and nursery inpatient services plus the general service ("overhead't)
cost allocated to these services; direct plus allocated overhead
costs of intensive care and other special inpatient care units;
and the inpatient portion of direct plus allocated overhead costs
for ancillary services. The sum of the first two of these components
is used as our routine cost dependent variable; the third is our
ancillary cost dependent variable°
A listing of explanatory variables is given in Table 1. Among
the variables in our technological cost functions, the volume of
patient service output is measured by the number of inpatient
admissions (ADM) while oUtput mix is measured by a scalar index
of case-mix costliness (DRCMIX) described below. The input
price measure is the nursing wage level in the area where the
hospital is located (NWAGE). Capital-stock variables are bed-days
available (BDDYS) (i.e., average bed-complement x 365) and the
ratio of special care to total beds (SPECRTO). As a measure
of teach5ng activity, we also include the number of approved
residency positions per bed in the hospital (POSBED).
In our behavioral cost regressions, explanatory variables
include county population characteristics oresumed to influence
product-demand conditions (NEDAGE, HSIZE, HINC, PUBASST, and-9-
MCARE) as well as the estimated service area population (HPOP),
which is simply the county population multiplied by the ratio
of acute care beds in the hospital to acute care beds in the
county.11 To capture possible substitutionor complementarity
effects of other available health care resources, ACRATIO and
NDPOP are included?2The capital stock, input price, and teaching
activity variables are also included. (Further information on
definitions and sources for independent variables is given in
the Appendix.)
Our case mix costliness index (DRGNIX) is deveLoped from data
on the diagnostic classification and charges for all discharged
patients. The computational method begins by defining a "market
basket" set of nine DRG's. The average charge in 1980 for each
of the nine DRC's in each hospital was calculated and these nine
averages were themselves averaged (within each hospital) to
compute an overall "market basket" average charge for each study
hospital. This figure was then divided into the actual charge
figure for every discharge in that hospital in 1980 so that
charge data for individual patients were expressed relative to
the hospital's "market basket" average.
For each of the 383 DRC's, these relative charge figures were
then averaged across çatients within each hospital, and then
these hospital-specific averages were averaged across all hos-
pitals reporting at least one patient in that DRG. The result
was a statewide average relative costliness figure for each of
the 383 DRG's. Finally, these 383 DRG figures were applied to-10-
the frequency distribution of discharges in each of the study
years in each hospital to compute the case-mix costlinessindex}
The dependent variables and independent variables expressed
in dollars (HINC and NWAGE) were all deflated by a cost-of-living
index. Separate index values were computed for the Baltimore
area, the Washington suburban area in Maryland, and for all other
parts of the state. While this deflation procedure should serve
to control for general economy-wide inflation, dummy variables
for individual years are also included in our regressions.
Effects of technological change or other year-specific charges
affecting all Maryland hospitals should be picked up by these
duTrv variables.
GIR Variables
Three pairs of GIR variables were employed (see Table 2).
For all hospitals on the GIR for at least six months in a fiscal
year, a GIR duimny variable (GIRSTAT) was set equal to1.0. The
coefficient of this variable measures the one-time cost impact
of going on the GIL To allow for the possibility that the
initial GIR impact intensified or decayed over time, the length
of the time period (in months) during which the hospital was
on the GIR (TIME) was included.
Variables were added to allow for differences between teaching
and non-teaching hospitals in GIR impacts (i.e., GIRTEACH and
TIMTEACH). Such differences might be expected because clinical
decisions in teaching hospitals are more likely to rest with
physicians who are salaried hospital employees. Administrative
control over clinical decision-making patterns may thus be easier-11-
to establish in response to CIR incentives to reduce patientstays
and ancillary service volumes.
The third pair of variables, also analogous to CIRSTAT and
TIME, are CAP and CAPTIME. These are only non-zero for the three
hospitals whose per case payment limit was not based on theirown
past experience because their cost per case figures were deemed
excessive. For these hospitals, the per case payment limit imposed
a more stringent financial constraint than that experienced by
other GIR hospitals, and thus one would expect CAP and CAPTIME
to be negatively related to cost.
In addition, to capture any cost impact of going off the CIR
systn, the dummy variable ONOFF was set equal to 1.0 for each year
in which a previously GIR hospital was off the system. Similarly,
CAPOFF =1for 198]. for the two hospitals that went off the CAP;
otherwise it equals zero.
Functional Forth and Estimation Method
All regressions are estimated with the dependent and con-
tinuous independent variables entered in logarithmic form. Exceptions
are POSBED, SPECRTO, TIME, TINTEACH and CAPTIME which are entered
in linear form because of zero values for many data points.
To control for possible correlation of regression disturbances
for the same hospital over time, we have employed the fixed-effects
method of least-squares regression with pooled data. This method
involves the inclusion of dummy variables for each hospital in
the sample (save one if a constant term is also included). Co-
efficient estimates obtained with this metho.d will not be biased
by omitted hospital-specific characteristics that are stable over—12—
the study period. This is important in that these hospital charac-
tens tics may have been correlated with the GIR variable (since
hospitals were not randomly selected for the GIR program). Bear
in mind, however, that this method does not take into account
autocorrelation due to auto-regressive disturbances, and that it
is somewhat inefficient since any information from cross-sectional
variation is not used in estimating the regression coefficients.
Thus, it is a rather conservative method of measuring dR effects
in the sense that it will tend to yield less significant coefficient
estimates than other methods which are more susceptible to
omitted variable biasJ4
Cost Function Results
Estimated cost functions with CTIRSTAT, TINE, and ONOFF
included to capture overall average CUR effects are shown in
Table 315 In these results, none of tne three CUR variables
ever approaches reasonable levels of statistical significance.
Thus, when the number of admissions, case mix, and other factors
are controlled statistically, CUR hospitals did not incur signi-
ficantly lower costs than those paid under the per service
systems. Coefficients of other independent variables are generally
significant and have the exnected signs. The case-mix index has
the expected positive sign but is not significant; this is not
surprising in our fixed-effects model since case-mix does not
vary much from year to year within a single hospital. It is
also interesting to observe that the POSBED result implies a cost
differential of about 4.5 per cent between a hospital with no-13-
residency programs and one with 0.1 residentsper bed. This dif-
ferential is close to the official HCFA estimate of 5.79per cent
that was doubled to arrive at the indirect teaching cost adjust-
ment in the current version of the Medicare PPS regulations.16
While the three GIR variables in Table 3 did not showany
significant overall average GIR effects, regressions including
other CUR variables suggested differences in the CURamong our
study hospitals. When each of the eight GIR variables was entered
as the only CUR variable in our inpatient, routine, and ancillary
cost function regressions, significant negative coefficients
(one-tailed PC 0.1) were obtained for CAPTIME in an inpatient
cost regression (coefficient =-0.00165,.P =0.0492)and a
routine cost regression (coefficient =-0.00168,P =0.0608),
and for CAP in a routine cost regression (coefficient =-0.06654,
P =0.0460))Since CAPTINE is measured in months, these CAPTIME
coefficients imply a yearly rate of cost increase for CAP
hospitals which is about 2 per cent below the rate for other
hospitals. The routine cost result with CAP, rather than
CAPTIME, implies a 6.4 per cent lower level of costs for CAP
hospitals.
As is shown in the first two columns of Table 4, the CAPTIME
coefficient in the inpatient cost function remained strongly
negative when other GIR variables entered (though inclusion of
CAP reduced its size and significance). The GIRSTAT and TIME
results in these regressions suggest a negative initial CUR
effect balanced by a more rapid rate of cost increase subsequently.-14-
(Magnitudes of the coefficients imply that the two effects exactly
cancel at TIME =23months.) This is consistent with the extra
1 per cent in the inflation adjustment for GIR hospitals. On
the other hand, the GIRTEACH and TINTEACH coefficients almost
exactly offset the GIRSTAT and TIME coefficients implying essen-
tially no GIR effect on teaching hospitals.
Stepwise inclusion of additional GIR variables in the routine
cost regressions (columns 3, 4 and 5 of Table 4) does not markedly
change the CAP and CAPTIME results but the negative CAPOFF
coefficient (which is only slightly smaller than the CAP co-
efficient) implies that routine cost savings of being on the.
CAP were not reversed immediately when CAP hospitals went
onto the standard GIR system. The pattern of significant and
offsetting coefficients for GIRSTAT vs. GIRTEACH and TIME vs.
TIMTEACH was much weaker in the routine cost regresssions.
This pattern re-emerged very clearly in the ancillary cost
regressions (columns 6 and 7 of Table 4) while the negative
effects for the CAP variables were again somewhat weaker than
in the total inpatient or routine cost analyses.
In summary, our results indicate (1) a negative cost impact
of being on the CAP primarily stemming from lower routine costs
and (2) a negative initial GIR cost effect for non-teaching hos-
pitals which decays over time and which is seen mainly in the
ancillary cost areas.
Results for Behavioral Cost Rejression
Coefficients for GIRSTAT, TIME and ONOFF are larger ard
more significant in our behavioral cost regressions (Table 5)—15-
than in the technological cost functions reportedabove; however
none of the two-tailed P-values for those coefficients are less
than 0.1. With total inpatient cost as the dependent variable,
we obtain a negative initial GIR impact which decays over time
and, turns positive at TIME =24months; the negative ONOFF
coefficient implies that the GIRSTAT impact is not reversed by
going off the dR. For inpatient cost per case, however, pre-
cisely the opposite time pattern is observed. (The same patterns
were also observed when these regressions were re-estimated with
ancillary costs and then routine costs as dependent variables.
Results are available on request from the authors.) The reasons
for these divergent patterns are not clear. One possible explana-
tion is that hospitals undertaking capital expansions were placed
on the dIR when these expansions were not expected to increase
admissions substantially. If so, the small coefficient of EDDYS
in the cost per case regressions may have understated the positive
impact of capital expansion on cost per case and the positive
GIRSTAT coefficient corrected for this error.
Significance levels for the coefficients of the other inde-
pendent variables range widely. The capital stock variables,
BDDYS and SPECRTO, are significantly positive in both regressions.
The inpatient cost per case result for BODYS arises from positive
BDDYS impacts on both length of stay and case-mix costliness;18
it is likely this case-mix effect is due to bed-size picking
up effects of other correlated capital measures (e.g.. major
equipment and sophisticated services). The wage variable (NWAGE)
is significantly positive, as expected, but the magnitude of-16-
its coefficient is rather large and suggests a correlation with
other omitted factor prices. While the market population (RPOP)
and teaching variable (POSBED) have strongly positive effects
on total costs, it is surprising that their cost per case coeffi-
cients are negative (and insignificant for POSBED). The negative
HPOP effect on cost per case reflects its negative effects on
both length of stay and case-mix costlinessj9 Among the re-
tnaining variables only the Medicare population percentage (MCARE)
is significant (and negative) in the total cost regression.
While this result might be expected in the cost per case regres-
sion, because of differences in case-mix and length of stay
between Medicare beneficiaries and the rest of the population,2°
it is unclear why this result is stronger in the total inpatient
cost regression.
When each of our eight GIR variables was entered as the only
GIR variable in our behavioral cost regressions, one-tailed P-values
for their estimated coefficients were not generally below 0.1.
Exceptions were the positive TIME and TINTEACH coefficients (PO.0484
and 0.0921 respectively) and the negative CAP coefficient (P0.0558)
in the total inpatient cost regressions, and the negative CAPTIME
coefficient (P=0.0057) in the inpatient cost per case regression.
Results when all eight GIR variables were allowed to enter step-
wise are shown in Table 6.Results for the total inpatient cost
regressions (columns 1-3) are similar to the corresponding
cost function results (Table 4 •columns1 and 2) except that CAP
is more strongly negative than CAPTIME. In the cost per case
regressions in Table 6 (columns 4 and 5), the negative CAPTIME-17-
coefficient is more significant while the pattern ofoffsetting
coefficients for GIRSTAT vs. GIRTEACH and TIME vs. TIMTEACH
is weaker and the negative GIRSTAT coefficient is much smaller.21
Results for behavioral cost regressions with ancillary
costs and routine costs as the dependent variables (not shown)
paralleled the cost function results (in Table 4) in tworespects.
First, the pattern of offsetting GIRSTAT vs. CIRTEACH and TIMEvs.
TINTEACH coefficients was only evident in the ancillary cost
regressions; second, the CAP and CAPTIME results are generally
weaker than in the total cost regressions, with only thenega-
tive CAP coefficient in the routine cost regression nearing
conventional statistical significance levels. The same ob-
servations apply to routine and ancillary cost per case regres-
sions with two exceptions: in both regressions CAPTIME is
strongly negative and in the ancillary cost per case regression
the positive CIRTEACH coefficient is clearly larger and more
significant than the negative GIRSTAT coefficient. (Results
of these regressions are available on request from the authors.)
Summaryand ConclUsthns
Basedon the generally weak results for our GIR variables
and the strong negative results for CAPTIME in our cost function
and behavioral cost per case regressions, the major conclusion
which emerges from our study is that GIR impacts on cost per
case were only significant for those hospitals in which the
per case payment level was set in a very stringent manner (i.e.
the CAP hospitals). While other GIR hospitals could have in-
creased their net revenues by responding more vigorously to the-18-
GIR incentives, it appears from our findings that the risk of
losses (to CAP hospitals) was a more powerful inducement to
cost control. Since almost all study hospitals (including all
GIR hospitals) were non-profit institutions, this conclusion
should not be too surprising. When the form of ownership
restricts the use of net revenues, the motivation to increase
profits is presumably attenuated. This seems especially likely
when the opportunities to increase profits involve changes
in treatment practices (i.e., length of stay, use of ancillary
services) over which hospital management has less direct control.
Another factor contributing to this result may be the existence
of regulatory cost restraints; the incentive to accumulate
retained earnings for reinvestment in expanded or more sophis-
ticated services and facilities is weakened by the realization
that regulators may be reluctant to approve higher rates to cover
additional service costs. In short, as an inducement to effi-
ciency the "stick" appears to have been mightier than the "carrot." 22
It is also of interest that the negative impact of the CAP
on cost was somewhat stronger for routine patient care rather
than ancillary services.23 This may be an indication that
hospital management has greater control over the costs of nursing
care than ancillary service costs, or that treatment decisions
regarding length of stay are more susceptible to management
influence than are decisions about specific diagnostic and thera-
peutic procedures. A third possible explanation is that certain
overhead costs have been more susceptible to management control
and that these costs tend to be allocated primarily tonursing
care cost ccnt:ers.-19-
Another interesting aspect of our findingsemerges from a
comparison of the behavioral regressions for inpatient cost
per case and total inpatient cost. The strongly negative CAPTIME
coefficient disappears in the latterregressions while the
positive TINE and negative CAP coefficientsapproach statis-
tical significance. Thus, itappears that the negative effect
of the CAP on cost percase, particularly as the period on the
CAP increases, is attenuated by increases inadmissions so that
the negative effect on total inpatientcosts is much weaker.
As noted in our introduction, thistype of volume response seems
consistent with the incentives of aper case payment system;
thus our finding reinforces theconcerns about positive admissions
effects of payment arrangements suchas the new Medicare Prospective
Payment System.24 In part because of these incentivesto increase
volume, the Maryland HSCRC has recently implemented afixed-budget
or capitation payment formula for a small number of rural
hospitals.
Finally, while these results may support more generalcon-
clusions about the relative merits ofper case and per service
payment systems, it is important to take note of factors that
may have contributed to these findings. First, when judged by
experience in other states, the per servicepayment system in
Maryland appears to be fairly stringent. Thus, the additional
incentives to control unit costs under the GIRmay have been
modest in comparisons with the overallpressures for unit cost
control imposed by the system on both GIR and non-GIRhospitals.
Second, the length of time on the GIR for hospitals in thestudy
\lflSfairlyf;liort (avernging iiiitideflyer two years) .Siihsoqucnt-20-
research with a longer time frame may show clearer evidence
of cost impacts. Third, the statistical procedures we have
employed are conservative. Use of the fixed-effects model
tends to produce lower significance levels since it excludes
information from cross-sectional variation in estimating the
parameters of interest. This problem is exacerbated by the
necessity of using a number of GIR variables, to test for
differences in impacts between types of hospitals (CAP vs.
non-CAP,teaching vs. non-teaching) and over time, since many
of thesevariables will be strongly correlated with one another.
Our ongoing research with a longer time series of data for
Maryland will hopefully yield more powerful tests and will
also allow us to.compareper-case and fixed-budget payment
approaches.—21—
Table 1: Definitions of Explanatory Variables
Nanie Definition
ADM Admissions to the hospital
BDDY.S Acute care bed-days available in the hospital
SPECRTO Ratio of special care beds to total acute
care beds in the hospital
POSBED Positions in approved residency programs
per available acute care bed-day
in the hospital
DRGNIX Case-mix costliness index value for
thehospital
MEDAGE Median age of county population
HSIZE Mean number of persons per household in county
HINC Median county household income, deflated
PUBASST Ratio of county AFDC, general assistance,
and 551 recipients to county population
MCARE Ratio of county Medicare aged and disabled
enrollees in Part A or Part B to
county population
HPOP Estimated population in hospital market area
ACRATIO Ratio of acute care bed days to total bed
days available in the county
MDPOP Ratio of patient-care physicians in
office-based practice to population
in the- county
NWAGE General duty nurse wage in the area, deflated—22-
Table 2 Definitions of GIR Variables
Name Definition
GIRSTAT =1if a hospital is on the GIR for at least
six months of the fiscal year; =0 otherwise
GIRTEACH =1if GIRSTAT =1 and the hospital has any approved
residency programs; =0 otherwise
TIME Time in months fran date the hospital went on
the GIR to the midpoint of the fiscal year (if
GIRSTAT =1);=0 otherwise
TIMTEACH =GIRTEACH*TIME
CAP =1if GIRSTAT =1and the hospital's per case
rate is based on an external CAP
CAPTIME Time in months from the date the hospital
went on the CAP to the midpoint of the fiscal
year (if CAP =1);0 otherwise
ONOFF =1if the hospital was not on the GIR for
six months of the fiscal year but had been
previously; 0 otherwise
CAPOFF =1if CAP =0for the current fiscal year






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5 :Behavioral Cost Regressions With GIRSTAT,
TIME, and ONOFF
Dep. Vble.: Inpatient Cost IT1j05t
Indep.Vbles. Coeff. P Coeff. P
GIRSTAT —0.02158 0.1988 0.03131 0.1745
TIME 0.00089 0.1079—0.00086 0.2568
ONOFF —0.02912 0.2665 0.04040 0.2615
BDDYS 0.69822 0.0000 0.22160 0.0337
SPECRTO 1.35067 0.0001 1.94480 0.0000
POSBED 242.603 0.0112—94.3274 0.4683
NWAGE 1.15859 0.0000 1.04991 0.0065
MDPOP —0.06186 0.3871—0.05150 0.5997
ACRATIO —0.12708 0.4736 0.03718 0.8785
HPOP 0.16596 0.0536—0.20085 0.0884
MCARE —0.64638 0.0010—0.27874 0.2941
PUBASST 0.06530 0.3400 0.07573 0.4201
HINC —0.04863 0.8321—0.35872 0.2555
HSIZE 0.13539 0.6019 0.30654 0.3898











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix: Data Sources for Independent Variables
The princiDal source for data on the dependent variables,
BDDYS, ADM, and SPECRTO is the hospital's Medicare Cost Reports
(MCRs). In a few cases where data on beds or admissions were
missing from the MCRs, American Hospital Association Annual
Survey data were used instead. Data on residency programs used
to construct POSBED were taken from the American Medical As so-
ciationDirectory Of ResidencyTrainitig Programs. County
incomeand demographic data (used for MEDAGE, HSIZE, HINC,
and HPOP)were taken from the Salary and Marketing Managethent
AnnualSurvey of Buying Power. Recipient and enrollee data
for PUBASST and MCARE were obtained from publications of the
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services publications and the
Maryland Dept. of Human Resources. The numerator of MDPOP is
from the American Medical Association Distribution of Physicians
publications. The numerator of ACRATIO is computed from indi-
vidual hospital data in the NCR's; these data were also used in
constructing HPOP. The denominator of ACRATIO includes beds
in the numerator, ECF and subprovider beds for acute care
hospitals, and licensed chronic care hospital beds. The first
two of these items were taken from the NCR's; the third was
from unpublished tabulations supplied by the Maryland Dept. of
Health and Mental Hygiene.
To calculate nursing wages, data on numbers of RNs and on
nursing wage and fringe benefit costs per hour were comoiled
for each hospital for the years 1978-81 from theannualwage
surveys conducted by the HSCRC. Comparable data for 1977 were-28-
gathered by the Maryland Hospital Personnel Association (MflPA).
The 1977 MHPA survey data were requested from each of the re-
sponding hospitals and data were received from 26 of them. Area
average wages were calculated by dividing the state into 5
regions:. Western, Central, Eastern Shore, Baltimore area, and
Washington area.
The cost of living deflator is an index based on the living
cost for a family of four at the intermediate level as estimated
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (ELS). Data reported by ELS
on the Washington Area were used for hospitals located in Mont-
gomery, Prince Georges, and Charles Counties; Baltimore area
data were used for Baltimore City, and for Baltimore, Anne Arun-
del, Harford, Carroll, and Howard Counties. For all remaining
hospitals the BLS figures for non-metropolitan areas in the South
were used. Since the data apply to Autumn in each year, a weighted
average of adjacent years' data (with weights 3/4 for the earlier
year and 1/4 for the later year) was used to develop estimates
for the middle of the fiscal year (i.e., the end of the calendar
year). Finally, all figures were divided by the 1978 value for
the Baltimore area to express them in index form.
A variety of data sources were examined to determine which
hospitals had been placed on the GIR and the period of tine over
which GIR provisions applied. Staff at the HSCRC supplied us
with preliminary listings of hospitals and dates. In addition,
we reveiwed the HSCRC's files of rate orders, staff reports,
and minutes of commission meetings and, in a few instances,
contacted administrative personnel at specific hospitals to resolve
uncertain cases.25—29—
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be .7. The weighted average of these two factors is 0.62;
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Health Services Research 19 (December 1984): 639-664.
10. Direct and allocated costs for SNFs, sub-providers and
outpatient services rendered to inpatients were not included.
Also excluded were expenses for personal patient care services
rendered by physicians (since these are not covered under
Part A of Medicare).. This latter exclusion is particularly
important in rendering the dependent variable comparable across
teaching and non-teaching hospitals, and in controlling for
shifts to direct billing by hospital-based specialists to
avoid regulatory controls on rates.
.-31-
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11. Note that this measure increases as the hospital increases
its bed stock (unless there are no other hospitals in the
county) and decreases as other hospitals in the county ex-
pand their bed stock.
12. Lower values of ACRATIO and higher values of MDPOP are
indicative of greater availability of other health care
resources. With HPOP and BDDYS already included in our
regressions, we asstmie in effect that physicians are distri-
buted among hospital service areas within the county in
pronortion to HPOP while non-acute beds (e.g., ECF's,
chronic care hospitals) are distributed in proportion to
BDDYS.
13. Use of this index based on relative weights has one important
advantage over an index based on absolute charges. In
particular, this index is much less sensitive to variations
among DRGs in the distribution of patients across hospitals.
Thus, any particular DRG that might happen to be more coron
in less efficient hospitals will not have a high relative
costliness weight simply because of this fact. Since the
potential correlation between the case mix index and eff i-
ciency is thereby attenuated, efficiency impacts of the
GIR variables should be measured more precisely. For
further information on the construction of our index and
the calculated index values, see D. Steinwachs and D. Salkever,
"Impact of 'Per Case' Versus 'Per Service' Hospital Payment-32-
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in Maryland." Final Report on Grant HS 03831 from the
U.S. National Center for Health Services Research, Health
Services Research and Development Center, The Johns Hopkins
School of Hygiene and Public Health, May 1984.
14. See R. Pindyck and D. Rubinfeld, Econometric Models and
Economic Forecasts, 2nd edition (New York: McGraw Hill,
1981), Chapter 9 and Y. Mundlak, "On the Pooling of Time
Series and Cross Section Data," Econometrica 46 (January,
1978): 69-85.
15. In all equations reported here, regression coefficients for
the hospital and year dummy variables are not reported.
Complete results of all equations are available from the
authors.
16. To arrive at the 4.5 per cent figure, we dividethe POSBED
coefficient (161.549) by 365 to get the coefficient for resi-
dents per bed rather than per bed day. We then multiply this
result (0.4426) by 0.1, take the antilog (1.045), subtract 1.0
and multiply by 100 to arrive at our percentage change figure.
For a discussion of the HCFA result, see J. Lave, The Medicare
Adjustment for the Indirect Costs of Medical Education:His-
torical Development and Current Status. American Association
of Medical Colleges, 1985. It is interesting to note that
the interns and residents per bed figure used in the HCFA
analysis had 1.0 added to it to avoid taking logarithmsof
zero values for non-teaching hospitals. Thus,the difference—33-
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in logarithms of costs between values of 0.0 artd 0.1 for
interns and residents per bed is actually (in 1.1 -in1.0)
x .579 =.c53x .579 =.0552.The antilog gives a cost
differential of 5.68 per cent for the HCFA analysis.
17. Where a single GIR variable is used to test the hypothesis
of a negative GIR cost effect, a one-tailed P isappropriate;
P-values reported here are one-tailed.
18. These impacts are estimated from length-of-stay and case-mix
regressions reported in Salkever and Steinwachs (note 8).
19. See note 18.
20. See note 18.
21. The results described in this paragraph were obtained from
regressions in which the five least significant independent
variables (other than GIR variables) were deleted. These
five variables were identified by reestimating theregres-
sions in Table 5 with all GIR variables included. Exclusion
of these variables from the regressions reported on here
had no material effects on the findings for the GIR variables.
Regression results with all variables included are available
on request from the authors.
22. Note the similarity between our conclusion and the argument
recently advanced by Fuchs that the ongoing changes nationally
in hospital financing will impact on hospital behavior pre-
cisely because "there is a real prospect that the hospital
will not have enough revenue to cover its costs." See-34-
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V. Fuchs, "Paying the Piper and Calling the Tune: mph-
cations of Changes in Reimbursement," National Burea of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 1605, April 1985.
23 .Theancillary cost per case behavioral regression is the
sole exception to this statenent.
24. For more direct evidence of this positive admission effect
under the GIR in Maryland, see Salkever and Steinwachs (note 8).
25. More detailed information on data sources and variable con-
struction is given in Steinwachs and Salkever (notel3 ),
Chapters2 and 3 and Appendices A-C.